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Political principals face high-powered electoral pressures while bureaucrat-agents face longer
term, low-powered incentives. Given constitutional constraints, what "carrots and sticks" do
politicians employ to control bureaucrats and how do bureaucrats respond to such incentives?
We use a simple career concerns framework and a unique dataset from the Indian Administra-
tive Service to address these issues. State level politicians (Chief Ministers) exert control over
bureaucrats when they assume o¢ ce, through a novel mechanism of reassignment (transfers)
to new jobs. Transfers are less likely if district politicians belong to the same party as the Chief
Minister, i.e. he appears to treat local politicians and bureaucrats as substitutes. We use a
framework where bureaucrats di¤er in their willingness to invest in job expertise or political
loyalty. Consistent with this framework, we nd in our data that more able bureaucrats and
those with greater job-specic experience are less likely to be reassigned when a new politician
assumes o¢ ce. In accordance with politiciansdistrict reassignment patterns, we do not nd
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robust evidence of any negative impact of such politically-induced transfers on development
and policy outcomes at the district level.
1 Introduction
Bureaucrats are ubiquitous in all economies, but they loom especially large in developing ones.
While politicians legislate and set overall priorities for public good provision, the actual imple-
mentation and delivery of public goods to citizens is largely the domain of bureaucrats. In this
context, much has been written about the two groups of agents that the bureaucracy links, but
less so about this vital mediating institution.1 Recent principal-agent literature has devoted some
theoretical attention to the interaction between politicians and bureaucrats, given their di¤ering
incentives. However, economists have shed little empirical light on how bureaucracies work and
interact with political institutions, especially in developing countries. In this paper, we use data
on the career histories of bureaucrats in India to examine the factors that inuence the de facto
division of power between politicians and bureaucrats. We discuss the implications of the observed
relationship between these two agents for the motivation of bureaucrats and present some evidence
of its impact on socio-economic outcomes.
Bureaucrats in public service typically have low-powered incentives, while their political prin-
cipals face high-powered electoral pressures in representative democracies. Such a contrast in
their incentives is often by constitutional design, as is the insulation a¤orded to bureaucrats from
political inuence. Recent papers by Maskin and Tirole (2004) and Alesina and Tabellini (2007)
highlight the role of short-term pressures on politicians to justify having insulation of bureaucrats
from politicians. In developed countries, there is evidence that such di¤erences in the incentives
1Two strands of literature are related to our study of the bureaucracy. The literature on public good provision has
focused mainly on the two sets of players that bureaucrats link: political parties/representatives and heterogeneous
citizen-voter groups. Persson and Tabellini (2000) provide a comprehensive review of the theoretical literature on
the political economy aspects of public good provision. The empirical literature examines the impact of politician
and voter characteristics on public goods provision, including voter heterogeneity (Alesina and La Ferrara (2000);
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999)), political representation of specic voter groups (Pande(2003); Chattopadhyay
and Duo(2004); Banerjee and Somanathan (2007)) and politician incentives (Besley and Burgess (2002)). The
institutions literature typically analyzes one specic institution, such as property rights (Banerjee and Iyer (2005)),
democracy (Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)) or legal origin (La Porta et al (1998)). In contrast to these papers, we
focus on the interaction between two key institutions: political representatives and the bureaucracy.
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of public o¢ cials lead to systematically di¤erent outcomes (Besley and Coate (2003); Besley and
Payne (2003); Weingast and Moran (1983)). The arguments in favor of bureaucratic insulation
from political pressures are likely to be stronger in a developing country, with a politically less
sophisticated electorate. Bardhan (1999) goes further to argue that bureaucratic insulation may
have broader implications for the process of development itself.
Given constitutional constraints, what carrots and sticksdo political principals facing short
term electoral pressures employ to motivate bureaucrat agents with longer term career concerns?
Recent work has addressed these questions at a theoretical level, both on the delegation of power
by politicians to bureaucrats (Alesina and Tabellini (2007); Calvert and Weingast (1989); Epstein
and OHalloran (1999)), as well as on the motivation of bureaucrats with low-powered incentives
(Besley and Ghatak (2005); Prendergast (2007)). On the empirical side, Rauch and Evans (2000)
conduct a cross-country study of how the structure of the bureaucracy a¤ects its performance, while
Wade (1982) and de Zwart (1994) o¤er descriptive accounts of Indian bureaucrats in action. Park
and Somanathan (2004) explicitly considers the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats
using data on Korean public prosecutors.
We analyze the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats using data on the complete
career histories of over 4000 o¢ cers in the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) between 1980 and
2004. Despite strong constitutional provisions for the insulation of bureaucrats from politicians in
India, we nd that politicians use a novel mechanism to motivate and/or exert their authority over
bureaucrats: frequent transfers (re-assignment) of o¢ cers across posts. Changes in the identity of
a states Chief Minister result in a signicant increase in the frequency of bureaucrat reassignments
in that state.2 Elections, at the state or national level, matter little unless they result in a change
in the Chief Minister.3 Our analysis further suggests both positive and negative e¤ects of transfers
on bureaucratsmotivation for performance.
Our state-level analysis suggests that the impact of a new Chief Minister on bureaucrat reas-
2The Chief Minister is the de facto executive head of the state government. In Indias parliamentary democracy,
he is usually the leader of the party which wins the largest number of seats in the state election.
3See Iyer and Mani (2007) for a detailed analysis of the impact of elections on bureaucratic turnover.
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signments does not depend on whether the party in power changes, or on measures of the partys
political clout, such as its seat share in the state legislature or its participation in the central gov-
ernment. This is somewhat of a puzzle, given Indias parliamentary system with strong political
parties. This puzzle is partially resolved by our district level analysis: we nd that a new Chief
Minister is not likely to appoint a new district-level bureaucrat if the local representatives from
that district belong to his party. A larger seat share for the Chief Ministers party in the state
legislature implies more local politicians from his party. Simply put, the greater political clout
of the Chief Ministers party is matched against a lower perceived need for transfers, especially
in the case of District O¢ cers. This nding also suggests that, in terms of policy control at the
district level, Chief Ministers regard local politicians and bureaucrats as substitutes. In terms
of bureaucrat motivations, this is not likely to provide strong performance incentives.
We nd that politicians do weigh the costs and benets of such bureaucrat assignments, though
we cannot pinpoint the motivations behind specic transfers. O¢ cers at higher levels of seniority
are more likely to be transferred; these are the o¢ cers likely to have maximum impact on policy,
as well as to have the greatest personal interactions with the Chief Minister. Key positions such
as the Chief Secretary (the top bureaucrat in the state hierarchy) and the Finance Secretary are
particularly likely to see transfers by a new Chief Minister. Together with the district level results,
this suggests that the primary benet of reassigning bureaucrats is that it enables the politician
to have greater control over policy implementation. At the same time, we nd that o¢ cers with
longer tenures in their posts are signicantly less likely to be transferred, as are o¢ cers of higher
ability. This suggests that politicians do value ability and job-specic expertise, which is likely to
provide positive performance incentives to bureaucrats.
Finally, we examine the impact of bureaucrat transfers on a set of district level outcomes:
implementation of infrastructure and immunization projects, as well as overall poverty reduction.
They appear to have little impact on outcomes either positive or negative. We note that this is
consistent with our nding that Chief Ministers regard district level politicians and bureaucrats as
substitutes, in terms of policy implementation: if bureaucrat transfers occur only to compensate
for the absence of a local politician from the CMs party, we would not expect to nd any di¤erence
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in outcomes.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the characteristics of the
Indian Administrative Service and the political setting in India. Section 3 describes our data,
sections 4 to 7 present our empirical results, and section 8 concludes.
2 Bureaucrats and Politicians in India
2.1 The Indian Administrative Service
The Indian Administrative Service (IAS) is the top layer of the government bureaucracy in India.
This service consists of a relatively small number of career civil servants: in 2005, there were less
than 5000 o¢ cers administering a population of over 1 billion.4 The IAS is the successor to the
erstwhile Indian Civil Service (ICS) set up by the British East India Company during the late
18th and early 19th centuries. IAS o¢ cers are career civil servants and sta¤ the most important
positions in district administration, various departments of the state and central government sec-
retariats, and state-owned enterprises. Each district is under the supervision of a District O¢ cer,
who is responsible for ensuring law and order, providing certain judicial functions, organizing relief
and rehabilitation in cases of natural disasters, implementing development policies and overseeing
all aspects of district administration. These o¢ cers are variously known as District Collectors,
District Magistrates and Deputy Commissioners in di¤erent parts of India.5 Lower levels of ad-
ministration are sta¤ed by members of State Civil Services.
IAS o¢ cers are recruited in two main ways: through nationwide competitive examinations
conducted by an independent Commission (direct recruits), and by promotion of the best-
performing o¢ cers from the State Civil Services (SCS promotees), the latter category being
restricted to not more than one-third of o¢ cers in a state.6 After recruitment and initial training,
4To have an idea of the overall size of the state in India, we should note that the central government of India
employed more than 3.8 million people in 2000 (41% of whom were employed in the Indian Railways), and central
government expenditure accounted for 19% of Indias GDP in 2005.
5These di¤erent designations reect the designations for ICS o¢ cers in di¤erent provinces of British India
6Nearly 50% of all posts are reserved for members of historically disadvantaged sections of society: 15% for
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direct recruits are assigned to specic state cadres, where they typically spend most of their
careers. This assignment of o¢ cers to states is done by a rigid (rather complicated) bureaucratic
rule, resulting in a quasi-random assignment of o¢ cers to states. In particular, it is very di¢ cult
for elected politicians or the bureaucrats themselves to a¤ect this assignment. Further, the IAS
rules state that not more than one-third of the direct recruits in a state can be natives of that
state.7
IAS o¢ cers start by holding positions at the sub-district level, and move on to higher positions
within the district, the state secretariat or state-owned enterprises. O¢ cers are usually appointed
as District O¢ cers after attaining ve to ten years of experience (this varies by state). Promotions
are based on years of service for the rst few years, and have a merit-based component for the
higher level positions. IAS o¢ cers are evaluated by their superior o¢ cers in Annual Condential
Reports. Recently, the Ministry of Personnel has initiated Performance Appraisal Reports under
which o¢ cers will be assigned numerical grades for their work output and completion of work
plans, personal attributes and functional competencies. Such work plans could include quantitative
targets, but this is not necessary. As such, it is not quite clear what outcome variables we would
use to assess the e¢ ciency of the Indian bureaucracy.
2.2 Transfers of IAS Bureaucrats
The Constitution of India designates the IAS as an all-Indiaservice, which means that bureau-
crats hold o¢ ce at the pleasure of the President of India, and cannot be dismissed or removed by
an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.8 In particular, this means that IAS
Scheduled Castes, 7.5% for Scheduled Tribes and, since 1992, 27% for Other Backward Castes.
7Broadly, the assignment rule is as follows: each state is rst assigned a home-state o¢ cer, then two o¢ cers
from other states. This order is adhered to over time e.g. if a state got one home-state o¢ cer and one outsider
last year, then the rst o¢ cer to be assigned to that state this year will be an outsider as well. This assignment rule
has specic criteria regarding reservation for various disadvantaged sections of society and the promotion of SCS
o¢ cers, as well as provisions to prevent too many of the top-ranked recruits going to a single state. An o¢ cer who
is not assigned to his home state is assigned to the next available state in alphabetical order.
8Constitution of India, Article 311.
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o¢ cers cannot be dismissed or demoted by state-level elected representatives. However, o¢ cers
can be reassigned or transferred from one post to another. These transfers are almost always
within the state, or sometimes between the state and central governments; transfers across states
are extremely rare. Such transfer orders are signed by the Chief Secretary (the top bureaucrat)
of the state, and decisions are usually made in consultation with elected representatives. While
bureaucrats can request specic assignments, they have very little power to a¤ect the outcome of
such requests.
IAS bureaucrats are transferred extremely frequently: in our dataset, we nd that the average
tenure of IAS o¢ cers in a given post is about 16 months and only 56% of District O¢ cers spend
more than one year in their jobs. This is in violation of the recommendations, put forward by the
Ministry of Personnel and the Fifth Pay Commission, for a three-to-ve year tenure in each post.
Interestingly, frequent transfers of bureaucrats was a feature of life in the old ICS as well; for
instance, Potter (1996) nds that two-thirds of all District O¢ cers in 1936 had held their posts for
less than one year.9 Gilmour (2005, p 220) provides a vivid example from an even earlier period:
...between 1879 and 1885 Colonel Tweedie did three stints in Gwalior, two in Baghdad, two in
Ajmer, one in Jodhpur, one on the road between Peshawar and Kabul as Political O¢ cer during
the invasion of Afghanistan, and another as Political O¢ cer in charge of Jalalabad.
In recent years, there are concerns that frequent transfers have become a tool of political
interference i.e. driven by politicians wanting to exert control over bureaucrats. Such alleged
politicization of the bureaucracy is a major public policy issue in India. For instance, the present
Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh expressed grave concern about this, warning that the failure of
the government to tackle the menace of the transfer and posting industrywill have a debilitating
impact not only on their performance and morale but also on the whole process of governance.10
Several other scholars and public gures have voiced similar concerns, including the former Election
9The reasons cited for frequent transfers during the colonial period included leaves of o¢ cers going home every
ve years, creation of new provinces, riots and plots against collectors, unhappiness with posts, incompetence, illness
and accidents (Potter 1996).
10Letter to all chief ministers, July 2004.
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Commissioner of India, Mr. Lyngdoh.11 A Public Services Bill (2006) currently exists in draft
form, which explicitly limits any o¢ cer transfer before s/he completes three years of service.12
2.3 Indias Political System
India is a parliamentary democracy in which elections are held every ve years, both for the central
government in New Delhi and the 28 states that constitute the Indian Union. However, mid-term
polls can also be held if the government falls with no alternative government being formed. The
election calendar resets to a ve-year one after any midterm poll. Di¤ering incidence of midterm
polls across states has now resulted in statescalendars being di¤erent from each other and from
the national election calendar.13 Typically, the leader of the party which wins a majority of seats
in the state legislature is appointed as the Chief Minister, and is the de facto head of the executive
branch of government in the state.14 It often happens that the current Chief Minister loses the
support of his party (due to internal party politics) or the parties in a coalition government fall
apart.15 In such cases, e¤orts are made to form another government, either by choosing a new
leader from the same party, or by putting together another coalition. If these e¤orts fail, the
central government often steps in to declare Presidents Rule in the state. In such a situation,
the administration of the state is brought under the central government until new elections are
held and a new government can take over.
11Free Bureaucrats from PoliticiansJuly 2003 at www.redi¤.com
12http://persmin.nic.in/DraftPublicServiceBill/
13For instance, the last national elections were in 2004, but ve states had state elections in 2006.
14The de jure executive head is an appointed Governor, who is constrained to act on the advice of the Chief
Minister and the Council of Ministers.
15For instance, in August 2004, Babulal Gaur replaced Uma Bharati in Madhya Pradesh because of the latters
loss of support within the state level party. A well-known case of a coalition falling apart happened in the state of
Uttar Pradesh in the late 1990s. Kalyan Singh of the BJP was the Chief Minister (CM), when the leader of the
Bahujan Samaj Party, Kanshi Ram, withdrew the support of his party to the state government. Kalyan Singh was
replaced by Mayawati as CM of Uttar Pradesh.
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3 Data on Bureaucrat Transfers and Political Events
3.1 Bureaucrat Transfers
We collected four types of data related to bureaucrat transfers in India: a data set of o¢ cer career
histories, a district-level data set of District O¢ cers over time, proxy measures of bureaucrat
quality and measures of the importance of di¤erent positions. The rst data set contains detailed
information on the career histories of all o¢ cers serving in the IAS as of October 2005.16 We focus
our analysis on 4047 o¢ cers serving in 19 major states, which comprised 96% of Indias population
in 2001.17 The data set provides information on o¢ cer characteristics such as gender, the year
of joining the IAS, whether the o¢ cer is a direct recruit(i.e. recruited through examinations)
or a promotee from the State Civil Service, and whether the o¢ cer has been assigned to his
home state. 13% of the o¢ cers in our dataset are female, 75% are direct recruits. Of the direct
recruits, 32% hold appointments in their home state, consistent with the o¢ cial rule of not more
than one-third home state appointments (Table 1, Panel A).
We have information on details of every post held by the o¢ cer: the start and end dates of
each post, the exact designation, the level of seniority, the department (e.g. Finance, Environment,
Health etc.) and whether the post was in the central, state or district-level administration. Based
on the start and end dates of each post, we construct a dummy variable for whether the o¢ cer
is transferred in a given year as follows: if he is recorded as starting a new post in that year, the
transfer dummy for that o¢ cer and year is assigned to be 1. If he does not start a new post in
that year, the transfer dummy is zero. If the o¢ cer has not yet joined the service, the dummy is
16We obtained this data from the website of the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions.
17These states are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jhark-
hand, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh,
Uttaranchal and West Bengal. Chattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttaranchal were carved out of Madhya Pradesh, Bihar
and Uttar Pradesh respectively, in November 2000. We exclude the following political subdivisions: the state of
Delhi, 7 smaller northeastern states with population less than 4 million each, 8 Union Territories which are gov-
erned by the central government, and the stae of Jammu & Kashmir, which is governed under special constitutional
provisions.
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not assigned any value. Multiple transfers within 1 year are coded as a dummy of 1 as well, so our
measure of the transfer rate is a lower bound on its true value.18 The probability of a transfer in
a given year is 49%, consistent with the earlier observation that o¢ cers hold a given post for an
average of 16 months (Table 1, Panel C).
Figure 1 presents the average transfer rates in each of the nineteen states, for the period
1980-2004. There is noticeable cross-sectional variation in this gure, ranging from a low of 41%
for West Bengal to a high of 52% for the state of Uttar Pradesh. Appendix Table 1 presents
correlations of state-level average transfer rates with other state-level characteristics. We nd
that transfers are somewhat lower in states with higher literacy rates and higher per capita state
domestic product. None of these correlations are statistically signicant, though that may be due
to the small number of observations. Further, it is not clear whether any causal interpretation can
be attached to these numbers; we present them mainly as a descriptive feature of our data.
Since the data set consists of all currently serving o¢ cers, it excludes o¢ cers who retired
in earlier years and is thus less comprehensive for earlier years. We remedy this in three ways:
rst, we check the robustness of our results to the exclusion of the most senior cohorts (where
the attrition due to retirement is likely to be the most severe). Second, we include o¢ cer xed
e¤ects in many of our specications. This would control for factors such as the characteristics or
size of specic cohorts. Third, we constructed a second data set on District O¢ cers over time
as follows: rst, we used the data on career histories from the rst data set to identify District
O¢ cer positions. We then lled in the gaps in this data by collecting information from the printed
copies of the annually published IAS Civil List, which lists the position held by each o¢ cer at the
beginning of the year.19 Transfer probabilities in our District O¢ cer data set are similar to the
overall data set, about 52% in a given year. We also constructed similar position-level data sets
over time for two other key positions: the Chief Secretary of the state (the head of the entire state
bureaucracy) and the Principal Finance Secretary.
18One-fth of the transfers in our data are caused by o¢ cers taking up more than one new job in a given year. Some
of these are multiple transfers during the year, and some are multiple posts being held by the o¢ cer concurrently.
19We were able to obtain the Civil List from 1985 onwards, with the exception of the years 1987, 1989 and 1991.
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Our third piece of data related to bureaucrats involved constructing proxy measures of their
ability. For this, we use two measures: their ranking within their cohort after initial recruitment
and training and whether they were selected later in their careers for more prestigious positions
in the central government. For the latter, the bureaucracy conducts a detailed review of o¢ cers
careers after about 20 years, and selected o¢ cers are empanelledi.e. deemed suitable for senior
central government positions. Such empanelmentof an o¢ cer is widely regarded as a sign that
the o¢ cer is of superior ability.20
Based on detailed interviews with certain IAS o¢ cers, we constructed a measure of whether
certain departments were considered more important or more prestigious than others. The Con-
stitution precludes formal demotion of IAS o¢ cers by state politicians, but a move from the
Department of Finance to, say, the Department of Youth A¤airs would be regarded as a de facto
demotion by most o¢ cers. We have obtained such information only for a few states as of now
(Uttar Pradesh, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh), and are working to rene this measure.
3.2 Political Events
We collected data on two main types of political events: elections and changes in the political
executive of the state. Dates of state and national elections are available from the website of
the Election Commission of India. This source also gives us information on the seats obtained by
di¤erent parties in the state legislature in every election, as well as the party identity of the elected
representative in each electoral constituency. We also put together information on the identity of
the Chief Minister over time.21 We then created dummies for whether the state had an election
in a given year, and whether a new person took o¢ ce as Chief Minister in that year. For changes
in the Chief Minister, we use a dummy which equals one for years in which a new person assumes
this post in the state.22
Over the years 1980-2004, states had an election about once every ve years, but a new Chief
20We obtained the data on empanelment very recently, and hence this version of the paper does not include results
with this measure.
21This information is available from the o¢ cial websites of the relevant State Governments in most cases.
22We dene a change in the Prime Minister of the country in a similar way.
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Minister once in three years (Table 1, Panel B). It is useful to emphasize that a change in the
Chief Minister of a state can happen in several ways: rst, the incumbent party might lose a state
election, as a result of which a new party comes to power and hence a new Chief Minister. Second,
it might happen that the incumbent party is re-elected, but chooses a di¤erent leader to become
the Chief Minister. In our data, about 54% of new CMs come to power as a result of a new party
coming to power (Appendix Table 2, Panel A). Third, there can be a change in the Chief Minister
even without elections, if his government loses a vote of condence in the state legislature (see
Section 2.3). Finally, in rare cases, there can be a change in the Chief Minister due to the death
or resignation of the incumbent for reasons apart from losing legislative support. Appendix Table
2, Panel B shows that only 52% of new CMs come to power as a result of elections i.e. nearly half
of the changes in the chief executive of the state are not related to elections.
4 Are Bureaucrats Insulated from Politics?
4.1 Theoretical Framework (Work in Progress)
Outline only:
 Politicians seek to control bureaucrats whom they cannot hire, re, demote, determine wages
or change the rules for.
 Two types of bureaucrats (initially exogenous) : Able  who derive utility from doing
their job e¢ ciently, from a social welfare perspective and Loyalwho derive utility from
implementing a particular politicians preferences
 This implies a positive rate of transfers in equlibrium, when a new politician assumes o¢ ce,
but bounded away from 100 percent:
 Politician transfers all loyal bureaucrats (who were loyal to previous party/politician in
power) and some of the ableo¢ cers (whose view conict with those of the politician). Thus,
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able bureaucrats are less likely to be transferred than loyal bureaucrats by new politician
too, upon assuming o¢ ce. (Our tests so far corroborate these predictions).
 Extensions of the basic framework: O¢ cers type is endogenously determined, depending
upon whether they invest in ability/expertise or loyalty.
 Some posts are "good" while others are "bad" but marginal cost of investment in ability
is lower for able o¢ cers.
 Implications for O¢ cersCareer Concerns decisions: Low ability types will invest in loyalty,
while high ability types invest in expertise
4.2 Initial Data Analysis
As mentioned earlier, we consider a specic measure of bureaucratic insulation, namely whether the
bureaucrat is transferred. This has the advantage of being cleanly observable, unlike other forms
of political inuence such as a politician asking a bureaucrat to do him some favors or a politician
overriding a bureaucrats decision on some issue. Our way of assessing whether bureaucrats are
insulated from politicians is simply to examine whether bureaucrat transfers coincide with state-
level political events, and if so, how large are the changes due to political events. We begin by
graphing state-level average transfer rates over time for each state in Figure 2. The vertical lines
indicate years in which there was a change in the Chief Minister of the state. We note that the
presence of a new Chief Minister is often associated with a spike in the transfer probability of IAS
o¢ cers in the state; this pattern is especially strong for states like Tamil Nadu and, to a lesser
extent, Orissa and Punjab.
We quantify the relationship between political and bureaucratic turnover captured in these
pictures in Table 3, using the following regression specication:
Transferjt = aj + bt + cPolChangejt + ejt (1)
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where Transferjt is the average transfer probability in state j and year t, aj is a xed e¤ect for
state j, bt is a dummy for year t, PolChangejt is a measure of political change in state j in year t
either elections or change in the Chief Ministerand ejt is an error term. Since transfers within
the same state might be correlated over time, we cluster our standard errors at the state level.
We nd that, despite the strong constitutional provisions for insulating the bureaucracy from
politics, bureaucrat transfers are signicantly inuenced by one very specic political event: a
change in the identity of the Chief Minister (CM) of the state. Table 2 documents the results from
running regression (1) for our sample of 19 major states over the period 1980-2004. Columns (1)
and (2) of Table 2 indicate that bureaucrat transfers are signicantly higher during years when
elections were held in the state, and in years when a new Chief Minister (CM) took o¢ ce. Column
(3) seeks to separate out these e¤ects, and we nd that the key political event which matters is
the presence of a new Chief Minister: after controlling for this, the coe¢ cient on the state election
dummy is much smaller than in column (1) and statistically insignicant. In related work (Iyer
and Mani (2007)), we use monthly transfer data to document that this spike in transfers occurs
mainly in the month after a state election, lending further corroboration that this is being carried
out by the incoming government rather than by other events during the year.
Appendix Table 3 presents the results of several robustness checks on this nding. Column
(1) shows that the statistically signicant coe¢ cient on the general (national) election dummy in
Table 2 is driven by two outliers: the states of Punjab and Assam did not have national elections
in the same years as the rest of the country in 1985 and 1991 due to internal disturbances. Once
we set their election dates to the national election dates, there is no signicant e¤ect of national
elections on bureaucrat transfer frequency. Columns (2), (3) and (4) of Appendix Table 3 show,
respectively, that this e¤ect of a new CM is robust to controlling for the presence of a new Prime
Minister, to dropping the years of Presidents Rule (when the state administration was conducted
by the central government) and to adding controls for the real state domestic product, the number
of crimes and the number of riots per capita in the state.23 The results are also not driven by any
23However, there could also be reverse causality in the sense that frequent transfers of bureaucrats might result
in a deterioration of law and order or poor implementation of economic policies; hence, we present this specication
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one state: we re-ran the specication of Table 2, Column (3) dropping one state at a time: the
coe¢ cients ranged from 0.034 to 0.046, and were always signicant (results not shown).
We go on to document that this impact of the Chief Minister on bureaucrat transfers is a
politiciane¤ect rather than a politicale¤ect, in the sense that the circumstances of the change
in politician identity do not matter for bureaucratic turnover. Column (4) of Table 2 shows that
the impact of a new CM on bureaucrats is the same, regardless of whether the party in power
changed or not. Similarly, Column (5) shows that Chief Ministers who come to power as a result
of elections have statistically similar impact on bureaucrat transfers as those who come to power
without an election. This specication also reinforces the fact that in election years where the
incumbent CM is re-elected (Election, no new CM), there is no increase in bureaucrat turnover.
The strongest corroboration for the personal rather than the party-driven element is provided
by the fact that the impact of the Chief Minister on bureaucrats is independent of his partys seat
share in the state legislature, and of whether he is part of a coalition government or not (Columns
6 and 7). Appendix Table 3 documents that the impact of the CM is similarly independent of
whether he is a rst-time CM or not, whether his party is part of the governing coalition in the
central government, and whether he belongs to the same party as the Prime Minister (columns
5, 6 and 7). Interestingly, we note that the impact of the Chief Minister on transfers is much
higher in the 1990s than in the 1980s (columns 8 and 9), though we should keep in mind that
our data is much more complete for the 1990s than for the 1980s. The period after 1989 saw a
marked increase in political competition in India, the loss of Congress party dominance, the rise of
several new regional political parties representing previously under-privileged social groups and a
strong anti-incumbency bias in election outcomes (Chhibber and Kolman 2004, Chandra 2004 and
Linden 2003 document these trends). The di¤erential e¤ect of the 1980s compared to the 1990s
can be partially explained by the rise of regional parties: column (10) shows that Chief Ministers
from such parties are much more likely to transfer bureaucrats when they come to power.
only as a robustness check. Kingston (2004) examines the relationship between riots and transfer frequency in the
1980s, and nds ambiguous results: transfers are negatively correlated with riots in the cross-section, but positively
related in the panel specication.
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5 Which Places See Greater Politician-Related Bureaucrat Changes?
We use our district level data set to document whether districts with certain characteristics are
more likely to see changes in the District O¢ cer when a new Chief Minister takes o¢ ce. The
District O¢ cer may be likened to the CEOof the district, with overarching responsibility over
most administrative matters in the district. These are positions of considerable importance: the
median population of a district in 2001 was 1.5 million people, and District O¢ cers frequently
administer budgets of the order of $2 billion.24 As such, these o¢ cers are crucial in linking the
Chief Minister to the voters in local areas.
We run regressions of the form:
Transferdjt = ad + bt + cNewCMjt + fNewCMjt DistrictChardjt +X 0jtd+ udjt (2)
where Transferdjt is a dummy variable for whether the District O¢ cer of district d of state
j was transferred in year t, ad is a xed e¤ect for the district, bt is a xed e¤ect for the year,
NewCMjt is a dummy indicating whether a new Chief Minister came to power in state j in year t,
DistrictChardjt represent di¤erent district characteristics (demographic and political) and Xijt is
a vector of controls for other time-varying state characteristics (state and national election years).
For this key position, we nd that a new CM coming to power raises the probability of a
transfer by ten percentage points or about 20% (Table 3, Column 1). This is in keeping with the
view that more importantpositions are likely to see more politically related transfers. Column
(2) shows that District O¢ cers in the most populous districts are the ones most a¤ected: for these
areas, the probability of the CM appointing a new District O¢ cer is nearly 15 percentage points.
We should note that this e¤ect is not because these areas are more likely to be urbanized and
have higher literacy rates: new CMs are not signicantly more likely to transfer District O¢ cers
in more urbanized or more literate places (regressions available upon request). This suggests that
the new CM is likely to appoint his preferred bureaucrat in places where a larger number of voters
can be a¤ected.
24Several o¢ cers have mentioned that moving from District O¢ cer to a higher level post in the state secretariat
often resulted in a decreased breadth of responsibility.
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Column (3) examines the pattern of transfers according to the political characteristics of the
districts.25 A District O¢ cer is 12 percent points less likely to be transferred if all the local
politicians (Members of Legislative Assembly, or MLAs, from that district) belong to the same
party as the CM e¤ectively bringing the likelihood of transfer by a new CM to zero.26 This
strongly suggests that bureaucrats and local politicians are substitutes in the chief executives
view, since the CM has little motivation to replace the district bureaucrat when he already has
his own manat the district level. This ties in with our earlier state level analysis, in which a
larger seat share for the CMs party had little impact on the transfer rate. Simply put, the greater
political clout of the CMs party is matched against a lower perceived need for transfers, especially
in the case of an important subset of o¢ cers, the district collectors. Column (4) documents
that this is not simply a function of political instability or a swing district phenomenon, by
including the interaction of the new CM variable with a measure of political turnover (fraction of
constituencies where the incumbent lost in the last election). This gives us more condence that
what we observe is the e¤ect of local politicians from the CMs party being present on the ground.
An alternative interpretation of this can be that local politicians also have preferences over which
bureaucrat is appointed to their district, and the CM gives weight to these preferences when the
local politicians are from his own party. In places where the local politicians are not from his
party, the CM imposes his choice of bureaucrat.
25For this purpose, we aggregate electoral outcomes to the administrative district level. State electoral districts
are usually subsets of administrative districts, with one administrative district containing on average 10 electoral
districts. All variables are further aggregated to the 1988 administrative district boundaries, to account for splits
in districts over time.
26The sum of the coe¢ cients on New CMand New CM * % local politicians from CM partyis not signicantly
di¤erent from zero. This means that if all the local politicians belong to the CMs party, then a new CM is not
likely to appoint a new District O¢ cer.
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6 Which O¢ cers are Transferred by the new Chief Minister?
In this section, we examine whether certain types of o¢ cers are more likely to be transferred when
there is a new Chief Minister in o¢ ce. Since we have data on the complete career histories of
o¢ cers over a span of several years, we can control for o¢ cer-level xed e¤ects and interact the
o¢ cer characteristics with the presence of a new Chief Minister in order to examine more closely
the impact of political changes. We run regressions as follows:
Transferijt = ai + bt + cNewCMjt + fNewCMjt OfficerCharijt +X 0ijtd+ uijt (3)
where Transferijt is a dummy variable for whether o¢ cer i of state j was transferred in year t,
ai is a xed e¤ect for the o¢ cer, bt is a xed e¤ect for the year, NewCMjt is a dummy indicating
whether a new Chief Minister came to power in state j in year t, OfficerCharijt represent di¤erent
o¢ cer characteristics (gender, experience, ability, length of tenure in the previous post and whether
the o¢ cer serves in their home state) and Xijt is a vector of controls for other time-varying o¢ cer
and state characteristics (years of experience, state and general elections).
Column (1) of Table 4 replicates the earlier state-level regressions with individual data and
o¢ cer-level xed e¤ects. We nd a very similar e¤ect of a new Chief Minister increasing bureaucrat
transfer probability by about 4.6 percentage points. This is reassuring because it means that our
results are not driven by some omitted state-level di¤erences in o¢ cer characteristics. In particular,
it means that our results are not driven by the attrition bias in our data set caused by the fact
that we do not have data on o¢ cers who have retired or left the IAS. Having o¢ cer xed e¤ects
means that an o¢ cer is much more likely to be transferred in a year when a new Chief Minister
takes o¢ ce, compared to the same o¢ cer in a di¤erent year. As in the state-level regressions,
elections do not have any signicant impact unless they lead to a change in the Chief Minister
(coe¢ cients not shown).
Individual level regressions also allow us to examine whether politician changes have an impact
on promotions of o¢ cers. Columns (2) and (3) suggest that most transfers initiated by a change in
the CM are laterali.e. occur between posts at the same level of seniority, and not promotions.
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In other words, the reassignments we observe are not a reward for past performance or routine
promotions that merely coincide with a new CM coming into o¢ ce. Having complete career
histories also enables us to identify the level at which these reassignments take place. Column (4)
shows that the new Chief Minister does not a¤ect transfers to central government posts in New
Delhi; all the reassignments documented in Column (1) are to state secretariat or district positions
(Columns 5 and 6). This is consistent with the fact that the CMs authority typically does not
extend to the central government; this also provides a robustness check that our results are not
driven by some changes in the central government which happen to be concurrent with state-level
Chief Minister changes.
Looking at the interactions with o¢ cer characteristics, we nd evidence consistent with the
idea that politicians take into account the costs and benets of reassigning o¢ cers when making
bureaucrat transfers. Column (7) looks at whether o¢ cers who have been on their jobs longer
have a greater probability of being transferred. A priori, this could go either way: longer tenures
might help o¢ cers build up job-specic expertise and hence it would be costly to replace them
with more inexperienced people. On the other hand, if the motivation for transfer was purely to
capture rents or to dispense patronage to certain groups, the length of tenure would not matter. If
the motivation was punishment" for being allied to the previous regime, we might even expect to
see that o¢ cers who have held their jobs longer to be much more likely to be transferred. Column
(7) shows that the interaction of new CM and the length of tenure in the post is negative and
signicant at the 10% level i.e. CM-induced transfers are concentrated disproportionately among
people who have held their jobs for shorter periods. This strongly suggests that the CM wants to
preserve job-specic capital when deciding which bureaucrats to appoint.
Column (7) also yields some other interesting ndings: women o¢ cers are less likely to be
reassigned and more senior o¢ cers are more likely to be moved into new jobs when a new politician
takes o¢ ce. This is consistent with the fact that the degree of interaction, as well as issues of the
division of authority between politicians and bureaucrats are likely to increase with the latters
seniority.
The results on length of tenure in a given post, seniority and gender are extremely similar when
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we restrict our sample to direct recruits only i.e. those who were recruited through competitive
examinations (Column 8). Since these o¢ cers are assigned to di¤erent states in a quasi-random
manner, we can see whether that plays a role in the CMs decision. We nd that o¢ cers serving
in their home state are signicantly more likely to be transferred when a new CM takes o¢ ce.
This is consistent with the overall local focus of the Chief Ministers embodied in the earlier result
that regional parties are more likely to transfer o¢ cers.
We then look at the impact of o¢ cer quality, measured by the rankings of these o¢ cers after
they complete their initial training. We nd that Chief Ministers are less likely to transfer higher
quality o¢ cers (Column 9): an o¢ cer in the top 10 members of his cohort is 2.9 percentage
points less likely to be reassigned when a new politician principal takes o¢ ce. In Column (10),
we show that this e¤ect appears to be acting mainly through an increase in the amount of job-
specic experience. Overall, these results suggest that politicians consider the costs of reassigning
bureaucrats when making transfer decisions.
7 Are development outcomes a¤ected by bureaucrat transfers?
Given that the observed results appear to be driven by the chief executives need to exert his
authority at the local level, we examine some district-level outcomes to see whether bureaucrat
transfers, and politically-induced transfers in particular, have any impact on development out-
comes. There are potential costs to frequent transfers: o¢ cers need some time to adjust to new
places and positions, and initiatives begun by one o¢ cer may not be continued by another. This
can be exacerbated if politiciansactions increase the transfer frequency. On the other hand, po-
litically induced transfers might mean that the bureaucrat is now aligned with the Chief Minister,
and hence is more likely to implement the politicians preferred policy. We look at two measures of
policy implementation: the extent of full immunization in the district, and the completion status
of road projects. The major caveat with using these outcomes is that these are only a subset of
the district administrators purview. Hence we do not capture a full picture of policy implemen-
tation in the district. As an overall measure of well-being, we also consider poverty reduction over
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ve-year periods, based on district-level poverty estimates provided in Topalova (2005).
Table 5 shows that there is no signicant di¤erences in outcomes in areas which had more
politically-induced transfers.27 There are no signicant di¤erences for other types of transfers as
well. The point estimates also vary in sign across the outcomes and specications, with no specic
trend. This is consistent with the results in Section 5 that Chief Ministers appear to regard
politicians and bureaucrats as substitutes; hence, changes in the bureaucrat occur only when the
politicians are not already aligned with the CM. If bureaucrat transfers result in all local decision
makers (bureaucrats or politicians) being aligned with the CM, then it is quite likely that they
will also have similar outcomes. This is not the only explanation behind the observed patterns,
which could also be driven by our outcome measures being too noisy to capture the impact of
these high-frequency bureaucrat changes, or by the top-level bureaucracy not really mattering for
local development outcomes.
8 Conclusion
We use a unique data set on the entire career histories of bureaucrats in the Indian Administrative
Service (IAS), the highest level of the bureaucracy in India, to study the relationship between
politicians and bureaucrats. Despite the protections provided by the Indian Constitution provides
for insulation of the bureaucracy from political pressures, we nd a signicant political inuence
on the bureaucracy through the process of transferring bureaucrats to di¤erent posts. Changes in
politician identity, specically that of the states Chief Minister increased bureaucrat reassignment
frequency by 8 percent. These politically-induced transfers have a regional character in the sense
that they mostly a¤ect o¢ cers who are from that state, and they are initiated to a much greater
extent by Chief Ministers from regional parties. They are also of a personal, rather than a political,
nature: the extent of these transfers does not depend on the circumstances of coming to power,
or on the legislative strength of the Chief Ministers party.
27Here we dene politically-inducedtransfer as one which happens to coincide with a change in the identity of
the Chief Minister.
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Local politicians and bureaucrats appear to be substitutes, suggesting that the chief executives
main benet from reassigning bureaucrats is to have his own manon the ground. The politician
also appears to consider the cost of such bureaucrat transfers: o¢ cers who have accumulated
greater job-specic expertise are much less likely to be reassigned by a new incoming politician.
Looking at some district-level measures of policy implementation and poverty reduction, we do
not nd statistically signicant di¤erences across areas which had a di¤ering extent of transfers;
nor do politically-induced transfers appear to have any di¤erential impact on these measures.
The latter is consistent both with the earlier observation of substitutability of bureaucrats and
politicians. One policy implication of this is that administrative policies directed towards limiting
the Chief Ministers impact on transfers are unlikely to result in large improvements in district-level
outcomes.
In future work, we plan to document the pattern of transfers across jobs of greater or lesser
degrees of importance or prestige, as a way to shed greater light on the motivations of politicians
and the incentives facing bureaucrats. Another potential direction of research is to document
explicitly the links between politicians and bureaucrats and examine whether these links have a
signicant impact on bureaucrats career paths. Understanding these links between politicians
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Panel A: Officer characteristics
# Obs Mean s.d. Minimum Maximum
Year of joining service 4047 1987 8.84 1968 2004
Year of birth 4045 1957 8.78 1945 1981
Proportion female 4047 0.13 0.33 0 1
Proportion of direct recruits 4047 0.75 0.43 0 1
Proportion of home state officers 3024 0.32 0.47 0 1
(out of direct recruits)
Panel B: Political change variables (1980-2004)
State election year dummy 415 0.23 0.42 0 1
General election year dummy 415 0.32 0.47 0 1
New Chief Minister (CM) dummy 415 0.33 0.47 0 1
New party in power dummy 415 0.18 0.39 0 1
Seat share of CM's party 405 0.56 0.16 0.13 0.85
CM's party has a majority of seats 405 0.70 0.46 0 1
CM belongs to a national party 405 0.78 0.41 0 1
CM's party same as PM's party 405 0.44 0.50 0 1
CM's party is part of Center coalition 405 0.50 0.50 0 1
First-time CM (since 1980) dummy 405 0.53 0.50 0 1
Panel C: Officer-year variables
Transfer dummy 69097 0.49 0.50 0 1
Years of experience 69097 11.41 7.94 0 36
Collector dummy 69097 0.07 0.25 0 1
Proportion in district administration 69097 0.15 0.35 0 1
Table 2: Which Political Events Cause Bureaucrat Transfers?














Is CM in a 
coalition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
New Chief Minister dummy 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.056* 0.038**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.029) (0.015)
State election dummy 0.030* 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
New CM, new party in power 0.038**
(0.015)
New CM, no new party in power 0.040***
(0.013)
New CM after election 0.052***
(0.017)
New CM, no election 0.035***
(0.012)
Election, no new CM 0.001
(0.015)
Seat share of CM's party 0.014
(0.033)
New CM * Seat share of CM's party -0.029
(0.052)
CM's party has majority in state legislature -0.012
(0.012)
New CM * CM's party has majority in state legislature 0.003
(0.019)
General election dummy -0.028** -0.027** -0.029** -0.082** -0.085**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.036) (0.037)
State and year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mean of dependent variable 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
Observations 415 415 415 415 415 405 405
R-squared 0.33 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37
Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for state-level clustering
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Does legislative 
strength matter?
How did CM come to 
power
Table 3: Which Places are More Susceptible to Politically Induced Bureaucrat Transfers








(1) (2) (3) (4)
New CM dummy 0.100** 0.085** 0.156*** 0.129**
(0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.056)
New CM * 5 most populous districts 0.062**
(0.028)
New CM * %local politicians from CM party -0.117***
(0.040)
% local politicians from CM party 0.014
(0.032)




Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
District fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Control for state and general elections yes yes yes yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52
Observations 6191 6191 6191 6149
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for state-level clustering.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
"Political turnover" is measured as the proportion of incumbents who lost in the previous election.
Interaction of New CM with
Table 4: Which Officers and Positions are Most Affected by Political Change?





















All officers All officers
All 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
New CM dummy 0.046*** 0.005 0.042*** -0.000 0.032** 0.014** 0.047** 0.028* 0.005 0.028*
(0.014) (0.005) (0.014) (0.003) (0.012) (0.007) (0.020) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014)
New CM * female dummy -0.028** -0.027** -0.029** -0.028**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
New CM * Years of experience 0.029** 0.027** 0.033*** 0.032**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013)
New CM * direct recruit -0.017
(0.020)
New CM * home state 0.028** 0.028** 0.028**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
New CM * length of tenure in post -0.011* -0.013* -0.015**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
New CM * top 10 rank in cohort -0.029** -0.017
(0.012) (0.015)
Mean of dependent variable 0.49 0.15 0.34 0.06 0.30 0.49 0.56 0.53 0.53 0.53
Officer and year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
 Control for years of experience 
(quadratic) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Control for state & general elections YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 69097 68007 68007 69097 69097 69097 58505 55218 51669 47407
R-squared 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07
Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for state-level clustering
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Column (4) omits officers in the first two years of their career, as well as a few outliers with job tenures greater than 90 months.
Table 5: Bureaucrat Transfers and District Outcomes
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean political transfers in last 5 years 0.007 0.316 0.120 -0.022 -0.053 0.055
(0.070) (0.197) (0.127) (0.217) (0.044) (0.040)
Mean other transfers in last 5 years 0.038 -0.118 0.012 -0.099 -0.005 -0.004
(0.066) (0.082) (0.137) (0.179) (0.055) (0.035)
Mean political transfers in last 10 years 0.026 0.028
(0.047) (0.039)
Mean other transfers in last 10 years 0.007 -0.059
(0.059) (0.044)
Initial poverty level -0.511*** -0.702*** -0.717***
(0.070) (0.044) (0.042)
State FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Mean of dep var 0.58 0.58 d for 0.62 0.40 -0.06 -0.07 -0.13
Observations 365 365 436 482 430 365 365 365
R-squared 0.69 0.68 0.51 0.43 0.23 0.33 0.62 0.68
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state-level





Appendix Table 1 : Correlations of bureaucrat transfers and state characteristics
Transfers 1980-89 Transfers 1990-2004
(1) (2)
Total population 0.0011 -0.1176
16 16
Population density -0.3989 -0.2844
16 16
% Scheduled Castes in population -0.1375 0.3232
15 16
% Scheduled Tribes in population 0.3796 -0.2395
13 16
Literacy rate -0.3974 -0.179
15 16
Gross State Domestic Product -0.2723 -0.2395
16 19
Gross State Domestic Product -0.3938 -0.1035
per capita 16 19
Growth rate of GSDP 0.073 -0.1851
16 19
Total crimes per 1000 population 0.0566
19
Riots per 1000 population -0.0591
19
Notes: Demographic variables (population, population density, % Scheduled Castes,
% Scheduled Tribes, Literacy) are from 1981 Census for the 1980-89 transfers, and 1991 census
for transfers 1990-2004. GSDP data are state-level averages of annual data; the period is 1980-89 for 
transfers 1980-89, and 1993-2004 for transfers 1990-2004. Growth rate of GSDP is between
1980-89 for correlations in column (1) and 1993-2003 for correlations in column (2). Crime variables
are averages of state-level data from 1991-2003.
Figures in italics are the number of state-level observations used for the correlations.
Appendix Table 2: Correlation between different political events
Panel A: New Chief Ministers and Party changes




No new CM 269 0 269
New CM 62 74 136
Total 331 74 405
Panel B: New Chief Ministers and Election years
No election Election Total
No new CM 248 21 269
New CM 65 71 136
Total 313 92 405
Data is for 19 major states from 1980-2004.
Years of Presidents Rule are excluded.
Appendix Table 3: Robustness Checks for State-level Regressions




















(2) (1) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
New Chief Minister dummy 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.047** 0.047** 0.008 0.056*** 0.091***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017)       (0.016) (0.019) (0.017) (0.013) (0.018) (0.022)
General election dummy (corrected) 0.020
(0.036)
New Prime Minister dummy -0.004
(0.031)
CM is a first-time CM 0.010
(0.014)
New CM * CM is a first-time CM -0.015
(0.020)
CM's party is in power at center 0.006
(0.007)
New CM * CM's party is in power at center -0.013
(0.018)
CM belongs to the same party as Prime Minister 0.006
(0.008)
New CM * CM belongs to the same party as Prime Minister -0.014
(0.016)
CM's party is a national party 0.017
(0.018)
New CM * CM's party is a national party -0.062**
(0.022)
State and year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Control for state and general elections YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 415 415 405 209 405 405 405 160 255 405
R-squared 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.47 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.27 0.45 0.39
Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at state level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Party power in central 
government
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Figure 2 (contd)
